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INTRODUCTION
As scholars have recently shown, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s earliest sex
discrimination work was grounded in anti-stereotyping theory.1 The particular
stereotype she challenged was that of males as breadwinners and females as
homemakers.2 As Cary Franklin notes, Justice Ginsburg’s approach was
grounded in “constitutional limits on the state’s power to enforce sex-role
stereotypes.”3 While Justice Ginsburg herself has come to realize that anti-

Professor of Law, Hofstra Research Fellow, and Associate Dean for Intellectual Life,
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. Early versions of this Article were
presented at a faculty workshop and the Feminist Theory Conference in Baltimore. Thanks
to the participants, especially Michele Gilman, Laura Rothenberry, and Sabrina
Balgamwalla; to Hofstra University and Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra
University for generous support; to reference librarian Patricia Kasting; to American Society
of International Law and its Executive Director, Elizabeth Anderson; and to Clara
Brillembourg and Kristine Huskey, Co-Chairs of Women in International Law Interest
Group, for appointing me to the Society’s observer delegation to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women sessions at the United States in
2012; to Courtney Gesualdi for a helpful edit; and to Joyce Cox for her skill in preparing the
manuscript.
1 Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on
Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010); see also Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, A Postscript to Struck by Stereotype, 59 DUKE L.J. 799, 800 (2010) (stating
that “[t]he authors have captured just what was on my mind and in my heart”); Cary
Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010).
2 Siegel & Siegel, supra note 1, at 779.
3 Franklin, supra note 1, at 86.
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stereotyping may not suffice to combat sex discrimination,4 her early focus on
the ways in which stereotyping affects men, specifically men who did not fit
the breadwinner stereotype, and her argument that only state-sanctioned
stereotypes are constitutionally offensive, remains a compelling paradigm.
This Article compares Justice Ginsburg’s notion of prohibited stereotypes with
the much broader ban set out in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),5 which requires states to:
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women[.]6
Part I explains how the U.S. Constitution addresses gender stereotypes in the
context of reproductive rights and reproductive work. Part II describes how
CEDAW treats stereotypes in these contexts. Part III describes the “economic
and cultural power shift from men to women” documented by Hannah Rosin in
The End of Men,7 which makes gender stereotypes increasingly outdated,
especially, as Justice Ginsburg insisted forty years ago, for American men.
I.

STEREOTYPES AND THE CONSTITUTION

Civil and political rights have been constitutionally protected in the United
4 Justice Ginsburg has stated that she “would not look to the U.S. Constitution if [she]
were drafting a constitution in the year 2012.” Interview by Al Hayat with Justice Ruth
Bader
Ginsburg,
in
Cairo,
Egypt
(Jan.
30,
2012),
available
at
http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/3295.htm. She suggests that the South African Constitution,
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or the European Convention on Human Rights
might be more useful as models. Adam Liptak, ‘We the People’ Loses Followers, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at A1. All three instruments expressly assure gender equality and
positive rights. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9 (stating that the “state may not unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including . . .
gender”); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (“[T]he rights and freedoms
referred to in [this Charter] are guaranteed equally to males and females.”); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex . . . .”).
5 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (Dec. 18,
1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]. President Jimmy Carter signed CEDAW in 1980. As a
signatory, under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the United
States must refrain from any action that would “defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
6 CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 5 (emphasis added).
7 Hanna Rosin, The End of Men, ATLANTIC, July/August 2010, at 56.
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States for more than 200 years. These rights are worth most to women whose
lives are most like those of men. When women seek “formal” equality,
demanding the same rights as men to freedom of speech, for example, they can
rely on well-developed equality jurisprudence.8
When women assert reproductive rights, or seek support for reproductive
work, they are in less-well-charted territory. Because reproductive rights and
reproductive work focus on experiences – conception, pregnancy, childbirth,
child rearing – that affect women more directly than they affect men, these
experiences are not reflected in traditional rights discourse.9 These rights were
not given constitutional protection until 1965.10 The scope of that protection,
and its limits, are considered below.
A.

Reproductive Rights

Reproductive rights were first articulated in the United States in Griswold v.
Connecticut,11 which challenged a Connecticut statute barring the use of
contraceptives. The Court situated the right to privacy in the penumbras of
“several constitutional guarantees,” including the Ninth Amendment.12
Griswold, however, only protected the couple’s freedom from state intrusion
into the marital bedroom.13 This both reflected and perpetuated women’s
subordination within marriage, since the husband was the decisionmaker in the
traditional couple.14
The privacy rationale for reproductive rights has been criticized since it was
articulated.15 Feminists have focused on the implications of “privacy” for
women.16 First, as Linda McClain observes: “[P]rivacy connotes female
seclusion and subordination, leading to women’s underparticipation in society
8

See, e.g., Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Toward a Substantive Feminism,
1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 35.
9 Men, too, have reproductive rights and these, too, may be denied. See, e.g., Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that a state’s sterilization of a particular set of
habitual criminals violated the criminals’ right to equal protection). The ways in which the
denial – and the assurance – of men’s reproductive rights reinforce gender stereotypes are
beyond the scope of this Essay.
10 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 505-06 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut
law barring the provision of contraceptives and medical advice regarding their use).
11 Id. at 479.
12 Id. at 484-85.
13 Id. at 485-86.
14 Carolyn J. Frantz, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 91-92 (2004)
(“Patriarchal marriages allow men to capture a disproportionately high share of the benefits
(including decisionmaking power) of marriage and bear a disproportionately low share of its
costs.”).
15 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 5, 11-12 (1978)
16 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93-102 (1987).
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and vulnerability to violence in the home.”17 These concerns are particularly
pertinent in the context of reproductive rights, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
noted in striking down Pennsylvania’s spousal notification law in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.18
Second, “privacy” is negative; it requires the state to refrain from taking
action rather than imposing any affirmative obligations. Grounding
reproductive rights in privacy, accordingly, undercuts claims for public
funding.19 Because the United States does not recognize affirmative
reproductive rights, American women enjoy only the reproductive rights they
can afford.20
American proponents of reproductive rights have long argued that these
rights are better grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.21 Justice Ginsburg relied on equality while representing a
pregnant service woman in 1972.22 But there are problems with the equality
argument. Sylvia Law notes its “lack of focus on biological reproductive
differences.”23 In addition, sex-based classifications are only viewed as “quasisuspect.”24 Unlike race, they do not trigger strict scrutiny, resulting in a
hopelessly convoluted jurisprudence.25 Like privacy doctrine, moreover, equal
protection imposes no affirmative obligations on the state.26
Finally, “equality” doesn’t go far enough. As Martha Fineman explains,
“We understand equality in terms that are formal, focused on discrimination,
and inattentive to underlying societal inequities.”27
B.

Reproductive Work
Like reproductive rights, reproductive work – bearing, caring for, and

17 Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 762 (1999).
18 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992).
19 Frances Olsen, Comment, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 113
(1989).
20 Id. at 116.
21 Id. at 108.
22 Brief for Petitioner at 9, Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178);
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,
87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 762 (2012); Siegel & Siegel, supra note 1, at 773.
23 Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 955
(1984).
24 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
25 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 485 (2004).
26 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require state funding of abortions for indigent
women).
27 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 2 (2008).
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educating children – has been recognized by the Supreme Court as protected
from state interference under the Constitution. States cannot prohibit parents
from having their children taught a foreign language in school28 or force them
to send their children to public school.29 The parameters of this protection are
fiercely contested, especially with respect to pregnancy.30
But what is not contested, what is not even discussed, is that virtually none
of this protection is entitled to material state support. With the exception of
public education, and a few struggling federal programs,31 reproductive work
is not supported in this country. Thus, while the decision whether to bear a
child is protected as a fundamental liberty interest,32 the consequences of that
decision are not supported at all. New parents are not entitled to paid leave.33
The United States provides far less material support for reproductive work than
any other industrialized democracy.34 The little the United States does provide
takes the form of ephemeral policy preferences;35 its support is not anchored in
rights.
The Constitution has nothing to say about the social importance of
reproduction. As Law notes, “Silence, absolute and deafening, is the central
theme of the original founders’ discussions of women and families.”36 The
28

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925).
30 See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal
Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 613-27 (2010).
31 See,
e.g.,
What
is
CHIP?,
INSUREKIDSNOW.GOV,
http://www.insurekidsnow.gov/chip/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
32 Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 122 (1995) (“By identifying abortion
as part of a more general liberty interest, the Court [in Casey] raised the stature of the
abortion decision, at least by implication.”).
33 JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS
MATTER 35 (2010) (“[T]he United States was an outlier, offering zero weeks of paid
leave.”).
34 See id. at 1 (“The United States has the most family-hostile public policy in the
developed world . . . .”).
35 These programs include, among others, the Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP), the Vaccines for Children Program, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program
for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), and Head Start. About Head Start, HEAD START,
http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/hslc/hs/about (last updated May 8, 2012) (promoting “the
school readiness of children ages birth to five from low-income families by enhancing their
cognitive, social, and emotional development”); Special Supplemental Nutrition Program
for Women, Infants & Children (WIC), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV.,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cga/factsheets/WIC_Quick_Facts.htm (last updated Aug. 8, 2012);
Vaccines for Children Program, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/index.html (last updated Nov. 14, 2012); What is
CHIP?, supra note 31 (explaining the CHIP program that provides free or low-cost health
insurance for eligible children up to age nineteen).
36 Sylvia A. Law, The Founders on Families, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1987).
29
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Constitution is as oblivious to reproductive work as the Founding Fathers
themselves.37 At best, those claiming reproductive rights are “left alone” in the
private sphere, rather than welcomed into the public sphere with appropriate
accommodations for pregnant or nursing workers.38 Rather, the Constitution
allows the widespread discrimination against pregnant workers described by
Joanna Grossman.39 It ignores what Joan Williams calls “our family-hostile
public policy,”40 the dearth of support which distinguishes American
workplaces from their European counterparts.41
II.

STEREOTYPES AND CEDAW

Cary Franklin has described the development of gender equality in Sweden
and its impact on Justice Ginsburg.42 But long after Justice Ginsburg came
home, women in Sweden, and women throughout the world, continued to work
toward gender equality. This work culminated in CEDAW, as well as farreaching U.N. initiatives.43
CEDAW addresses the major American critiques of reproductive rights
jurisprudence and the lack of support for reproductive work. First, CEDAW is
broader in scope than equal protection. It bars all forms of discrimination;
there is no requirement of intent, state action, or disparate impact.44 Second, it
requires states to proactively address the social and economic circumstances in
which reproductive choices are made.45 Third, CEDAW assures positive as
well as negative rights, imposing affirmative obligations on the state.46 Finally,
CEDAW explicitly addresses reproduction and reproductive work.47
A.

Women’s Human Rights
CEDAW requires states to assure women’s human rights, including their

37

See MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS & FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND
(1996).
38 WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 8 (“American public policy to resolve such [work-family]
conflict is virtually nonexistent, forcing us all to cobble together individually negotiated
solutions in the private marketplace.”).
39 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 30.
40 WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 33.
41 Id. at 35.
42 Franklin, supra note 1, at 97-105.
43 See Barbara Stark, Women’s Rights, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 341, 342
(David Forsythe ed., 2009).
44 Id. at 347.
45 See id. at 345.
46 Id. at 347-48 (“If laws treating women the same as men in employment do not result in
women becoming equal to men in employment, for example, additional measures, including
measures that treat women more favorably, may be required.”).
47 CEDAW, supra note 5, arts. 12.2, 14.
THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 3-17
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civil and political rights, familiar to Americans from our own Constitution,48
but they also include less familiar economic rights, such as the right to health.49
Under CEDAW, moreover, rights are to be assured in fact as well as in law.
CEDAW goes beyond formal equality (equality of opportunity) to require
equality of outcome.50 Article 4 provides for affirmative action “aimed at
accelerating de facto equality.”51 CEDAW, in short, requires the state to assure
actual equality between women and men, sooner rather than later.
B.

Reproduction and Reproductive Work

CEDAW, crucially, addresses reproduction and reproductive work.52 Under
Article 5, reproduction is both supported by the state and disaggregated from
women’s traditional roles. First, as noted above,53 Article 5(a) recognizes that
gender stereotypes are socially constructed, neither immutable nor “natural,”
and that they violate women’s rights.
Like the other human rights conventions, CEDAW requires states parties to
file periodic reports, documenting how each state is meeting its obligations.54
These are reviewed by a committee of experts, which holds annual sessions at
which state representatives appear.55 The Committee’s responses have clarified
the scope of Article 5. In Slovakia, for example, the Committee has expressed
concern about “the persistence of traditional stereotypes regarding the roles
and tasks of women and men in the family and in society at large.”56 It
48

See, e.g., id. art. 15.4.
Id. art. 12.
50 HILARY CHARLESWORTH & C. M. CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 217 (2000). See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 3 (1990) (“While
‘rule,’ or formal, equality may avoid the pitfalls of protective or ‘special treatment’ rules,
which can be used to disadvantage women as well as to help them, the application of equal
treatment assumes that those subjected to the rules are in fundamentally the same
position.”).
51 CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 4. There is extensive literature on CEDAW. Some sources
especially pertinent here include: THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS
OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: A COMMENTARY (Marsha A. Freeman, Christine
Chinkin, & Beate Rudolf eds., 2012); Rebecca J. Cook, State Accountability Under the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 228 (Rebecca J. Cook
ed., 1994); Alda Facio & Martha I. Morgan, Equity or Equality for Women? Understanding
CEDAW’s Equality Principles, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1133 (2009).
52 CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 12.
53 Id. art. 5(a).
54 Id. art. 18.
55 Id. art. 17 (“For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation of
the present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women . . . .”).
56 Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
49
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commended Nigerian programs undertaken to eliminate stereotypes, including
a new “National Policy on Education . . . aimed at encouraging increased
participation of the girl child in science and technology,” as well as data
indicating that Nigerian women are “beginning to undertake those vocations
which were previously considered masculine such as motor mechanic,
welding, commercial drivers and motor-cyclists.”57
Gender stereotypes may resonate across cultures, such as the widespread
acceptance of female nurses, or they may not, such as the outrage generated
when a Saudi supermarket chain announced that it would hire female
cashiers.58 Article 5 bars all such stereotypes, even as it recognizes women’s
unique reproductive capacity and men’s responsibility for reproductive work.59
Under CEDAW, women, like men, have rights and men, like women, are
expected to assume caregiving responsibilities.60
As noted above, reproductive rights are not reflected in traditional rights
discourse.61 CEDAW corrects this omission by recognizing women’s
reproductive work and requiring the state – and men – to support it.62 Whether
by a state or a non-state third party, whether by an affirmative act (such as
coerced sterilization) or by an omission (such as the refusal to fund elective
abortions), whether imposed on all women or a discrete group, whether the
objective is to disempower women or to promote women’s equality, the denial
of women’s reproductive rights is barred by CEDAW.
Second, Article 5(b) demands recognition of maternity as a “social function”
and requires states to educate men to share in reproductive work.63 Like Justice
Ginsburg’s early reliance on male plaintiffs, Article 5 recognizes that
stereotypes limit men as well as women and that “equality” must address both.
Additionally, CEDAW recognizes and requires the state to support “maternity
as a social function.”64
Later provisions spell out what this requires. Article 11.2, for example,
focuses on the right to work,65 including a prohibition of dismissal for

Women: Slovakia, 41st Sess., June 30-July 18, 2008, ¶ 32 U.N. Doc. A/63/38 (July 17,
2008).
57 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Sixth
Periodic
Report
of
States
Parties:
Nigeria
(Oct.
5,
2006),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4efb36213.html.
58 See, e.g., Fatima Sidiya, Debate Rages over Saudi Women Working as Cashiers, ARAB
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.arabnews.com/node/353055.
59 CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 5.
60 Id.
61 See supra Part I.
62 CEDAW, supra note 5, arts. 2-5, 11, 12, 16.
63 Id. art. 5.
64 Id.
65 Id. art. 11.2.
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pregnancy or maternity leave,66 maternity leave with pay or “comparable social
benefits,”67 and childcare facilities.68 Article 12 requires states to “ensure
access to healthcare services, including those related to family planning” and,
more specifically, to “services in connexion with pregnancy, confinement and
the postnatal period, . . . as well as adequate nutrition.”69 Article 14 reiterates
the right to family planning services for rural women.70 Finally, Article 16
requires states to “eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family.”71
Actual compliance with CEDAW varies enormously. In Sweden, for
example, recent reports suggest ongoing progress.72 Other states remain
notorious for their ongoing violations.73 Where those seeking gender equality
have access to the law, however, CEDAW has become a mainstay of the legal
culture.74 The next section describes the obstacles CEDAW faces here, and
how proponents may finally clamber over them.75

66

Id. art. 11.2(b).
Id.
68 Id. art. 11.2(c).
69 Id. art. 12.2. The Committee’s General Recommendation No. 24 elaborates on Article
12.1, addressing women’s access to health care, including family planning services. See
U.N. Report of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 20th
Sess., Jan. 19-Feb. 5, 1999, 21st Sess., June 7-25, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1; GAOR,
54th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1999).
70 CEDAW, supra note 5, art. 14.
71 Id. art. 16. Article 16 has received an unprecedented number of reservations. Rebecca
J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 643, 702 (1990) (“Article 16 is the principal provision of
the Women’s Convention requiring states parties to eliminate discrimination against women
in matters affecting marriage and family relations. It is the most heavily reserved of the
substantive articles.”).
72 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Combined
Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report of States Parties: Sweden (Sept. 14, 2006),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,CEDAW,STATEPARTIESREP,SWE,45c30c320,
0.html.
73
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:
AFGHANISTAN 40 (April 8, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/
(“Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Yemen, have persistent human rights problems including . .
. violence and societal discrimination against women.”).
74 See, e.g., U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2010: TRENDS
STATISTICS
111-25
(2010),
AND
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_full%20report_color.
pdf.
75 See Law & Versteeg, supra note 22, at 840 n.203 (describing a “substitution effect” in
which treaty rights substitute for constitutional rights). This is particularly useful where, like
in the United States, the Constitution is rarely amended.
67
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III. ONCE INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLES
Opposition to CEDAW, like opposition to all human rights treaties in the
United States, is grounded in xenophobia and American “exceptionalism.” But
it has a misogynist edge that opposition to the other treaties has not inspired.
This Part first compares CEDAW to the Constitution, showing how both are
gendered. It then explains why this doesn’t matter as much as it used to.
As noted earlier, the United States provides less support for reproductive
work than any other industrialized state.76 This results in greater parity
between male and female wage earners here until women have children.77
Historically, American women have paid the price in the form of weakened
labor force attachment.78 Women are now the majority in the workforce,
however, and they are also better educated than men.79 Patterns are changing.
CEDAW supports reproductive rights and reproductive work, for men as
well as women. As Justice Ginsburg recognized forty years ago, men have
always needed support for this work.80 And as Hannah Rosin explains, they
have never needed it more. The global economy is undergoing a sea change, in
which “thinking and communicating have come to eclipse physical strength
and stamina as the keys to economic success.”81 During the Great Recession,
for example, “three-quarters of the 8 million jobs lost were lost by men. The
worst-hit industries were overwhelmingly male and deeply identified with
macho: construction, manufacturing, high finance.”82
These men, like Justice Ginsburg’s early plaintiffs, are victims of outmoded
gender stereotypes.83 Again, like Justice Ginsburg’s plaintiffs, these men need
support. Their employment prospects are disheartening: “Men dominate just
two of the 15 job categories projected to grow the most over the next decade:
janitor and computer engineer. Women have everything else – nursing, home
health assistance, child care, food preparation.”84 Unlike women, who
increasingly take jobs once reserved for men, men avoid traditionally pinkcollar jobs.85 Like many gender issues, this is both internalized and
overdetermined.86 Some of these jobs require social intelligence that men often

76

See supra Part I.B.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 33, at 15 (“[W]omen who are childless at age thirty work
hours and earn wages similar to men’s. Women, it seems, have achieved equality as long as
they die childless at thirty.”).
78 Id. at 131.
79 Rosin, supra note 7, at 60.
80 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 22, at 55.
81 Rosin, supra note 7, at 58.
82 Id. at 60.
83 See id. at 64.
84 Id. at 63.
85 Id. at 64.
86 See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 1, at 779.
77
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lack.87 Others require bachelor’s degrees, almost sixty percent of which are
now awarded to women.88 The most stubborn, and irrational, factor may be
that they are perceived as “female” jobs. Boys don’t wear pink.89
These are precisely the perceptions addressed by CEDAW’s bar on gender
stereotypes.90 First, for men like Justice Ginsburg’s plaintiffs,91 CEDAW
affirms their caregiving work and requires the state to support it. Second,
CEDAW might encourage men who have shied away from such work because
of its perceived stigma to “come out,” and take advantage of state-supported
flex time, for example.92 Third, over time, CEDAW might allow even the
diehards to slip some of the bonds of gender, or at least enough of them to get
a job. It might encourage children, including the majority of American children
who are now being raised in “non-traditional families,” to take a more relaxed
approach to gender in general. CEDAW, in short, would build on
developments already well underway.
CONCLUSION
Justice Ginsburg’s early anti-stereotyping work has been re-discovered by a
new generation of scholars. This Essay has picked up where they left off. As
Justice Ginsburg herself suggests, anti-stereotyping is only the beginning.93
This Essay has explained why anti-stereotyping alone cannot assure gender
equality, what else is needed, and why the Constitution cannot be relied upon
to provide it.
Part I explained how gender stereotypes are formed and the consequences
for men, women, and the societies in which they live. Part II analyzed the
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limitations of the Constitution in this context, specifically its failure to
recognize women’s rights. Because of these lacunae, the Constitution cannot
effectively address gender stereotypes. Part III showed how CEDAW does,
and why CEDAW is as necessary for men as it is for women.
Finally, this Article has referenced The End of Men and its description of an
unprecedented “economic and cultural power shift from men to women.”94
Gender stereotypes, widely viewed as “natural” only forty years ago, are
increasingly recognized as anachronisms, for men as well as for women, as
Justice Ginsburg insisted even then.
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